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. STREAMLINING CONVEYANCING
PROCEDURE*
Paul E. Basye**

III
MARKETABLE TITLE AND STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

A.

Effect of Statutes of Limitations

Statutes of limitations have long occupied an essential and important place in every system of jurisprudence. They express a policy
that is essential to social progress · in a great variety of ways. Their
effect is particularly noteworthy in the field of property law where
they promote repose and give security to human affairs. "They stimulate to activity and punish negligence. While time is constantly
destroying the evidence of rights, they supply its place by a presumption which renders proof unnecessary." 66
It is true that land is sometimes acquired by wrongful dispossession
followed by adverse possession for the requisite length of time to give
title. But the vast majority of cases of adverse possession have their
origin in an intended transfer of title which is ineffective merely for
failure to comply with some formality of conveyancing. Possession
is transferred and, in all probability, neither party to the transaction
is aware of any irregularity and of the consequent failure of the conveyance. After the grantee has occupied the land for the required
period-adversely, of course, supposing that he acquired the title under
the conveyance-the statute of limitations operates quietly to transfer
the title. It is not a case of robbery. ''The great purpose," says Professor
Henry Vi./. Ballantine, "is automatically to quiet all titles which are
openly and consistently asserted, to provide proof of meritorious titles,
and correct errors in conveyancing." 67
"' This is the second in a series of two articles by Mr. Basye on this subject to appear in
the Review. The first was published in the May, 1949, issue at p. 935.
""'Assistant Professor of Law, Hastings College of Law, San Francisco; Member of Committee on Model Probate Code, Probate Division, Section of of Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law, American Bar Association.
66 From opinion of Justice Swayne in Wood v. Carpenter, 11 Otto (101 U.S.) 135 at
139 (1879).
67Ballantine, "Title by Adverse Possession," 32 HARv. L. Irnv. 135 at 135 (1918). This
purpose is expressed in the preamble of the English Statute, 21 Jae. 1, c. 16 (1623), "For
quieting of men's estates, and avoiding of suits..••"
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Despite the beneficial effects produced by the application of
statutes of limitations in individual cases, the importance of these
statutes for providing a good record title is not so great as might be
supposed. As already mentioned, there is no device for registering
a title acquired by adverse possession. Also, statutes of limitations do
not operate against owners of future interests, persons under disabilities, the state or other governmental units. Hence statutes of limitations
do not and cannot achieve their full usefulness as a means of providing the record of a marketable title.
Notwithstanding the foregoing observations on the limited effects
of statutes of limitations, they do in some respects have certain virtues
in promoting marketable title. Some have been made to apply to all
persons, including those under disabilities; some have been made to
apply to future interests; and some have been made to apply even
against the state and other political subdivisions. Statutes barring the
enforcement of judgments, mortgages and other nonpossessory interests have sometimes been applied to all persons so that it may be possible to say with confidence that an old, outstanding interest of this
kind no longer affects the title.
B.

1.

Legislation Barring Various Interests
Statutes Barring Governmental Units

The early English statutes of limitations did not bind the king.
Nullum tempus occurrit regi, no time runs against the king. According to Dean Pound, the origin of the maxim was "on the basis of the
paramount dignity of the sovereign." 68 Later it was said that the king
represented the whole people and could act only through his officers
and agents. To allow public land to be lost through the neglect or
connivance of these agents was said to be against the public interest. 69
This immunity of the sovereign from the statutes sometimes led to
oppression and was finally changed by the Crown Suits Act of 1769
and amended by the Crown Suits Act of 1861, limiting the period
for the recovery of land by the king to sixty years.70 By the Limitation
Act of 1939,71 this was reduced to thirty years except in actions to
68 Pound, "A Survey of Public Interests," 58 HARV. L. REv. 909 at 924 (1945). As
authority for this statement, Dean Pound refers to the opinion of Hobart, C.J., in Sir Edward
Coke's Case, Godbolt 289 at 295, 78 Eng. Rep. 169 (1624).
69 PRESTON ,U,.'D NnwsoM, LrMITATION OF AcnoNs, 2d ed., 77 (1943).

70Id.

712 & 3 Geo. 6, §4(1) (1939).
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recover foreshore lands, with respect to which the sixty-year period
was retained. This transition over a period of nearly two centuries
closely corresponds to a shift in the general feeling to the effect that
the public interest should no longer-be paramount to "the social interests in the security of transactions and the security of acquisitions." 12
In this country the United States is specifically excepted from
the operation of many statutes of limitations, although this exception
would obtain even in the absence of such a provision. As to suits to
cancel land patents, the United States has voluntarily limited the
time within which it can bring actions of this kind. 73 Repose to land
titles affecting whole communities and reliance upon them are deemed
of paramount importance. 74
Many state legislatures, likewise believing that this immunity in
favor of governments should no longer prevail with respect to land
titles, have seen £t to include the state within the operation of the
general statutes of limitations, or of certain special statutes. 7 5 Counties,
municipal corporations and other governmental units are more frequently being made amenable to statutes of limitations,76 although
exceptions are frequently made as to streets, alleys, parks and property
held for public use. 7 7 Amendments to existing legislation to include
the state within the scope of existing statutes of limitations are clearly
called for.
2.

Statutes Barring Persons under Disabilities

There are undoubted instances where one may safely disregard
an ancient title or claim appearing of record where there has been
no assertion thereof against a subsequent title supported by possession. But the solicitude of the statute for persons under disabilities
makes it relatively ineffective to accomplish its great purpose, namely, to
quiet titles. As a consequence, favorable appraisals of titles otherwise
marketable cannot be made because of the possibility that outstanding
interests may be owned by persons under disabilities. The period
"A Survey of Public Interests," 58 HARV. L. REv. 909 at 924 (1945).
7326 Stat. L. 1099, (1891); 43 U.S.C. §1166 (1946).
74 U.S. v. Winona & St. P. R.R., 165 U.S. 463, 17 S.Ct. 368 (1897).
75 As indicative of this legislative trend see statutes discussed under part ill B 6, infra.
76 On this subject generally see Taylor, "Titles to Land by Adverse Possession," 20
IowA L. REv. 551, 738 (1935); 2 DEMBrrz, LAND TITLES, §179 (1895); 5 MICH. S-r. B.J.
58 (1925); 5 THOMPSON, REAL PROPER'I'Y, PERM. ED., §2664 (1940); 4 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY, 3d ed., §1170 (1939); 2 C.J. Adverse Possession, §§12, 215.
77 4 TIFFANY, REAL PRoPER'I'Y, 3d ed., 495 (1939).
12 Pound,
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of the general statute of limitations in the different states varies from
five to thirty years, with a considerable number providing for ten,
fifteen or twenty years. Within fifteen or twenty years most minors
attain their majority and many others overcome their disabilities. In
actual practice statutes of limitations would operate substantially as
well even though persons under disabilities were not given additional
time to recover land.
Statutes of limitations providing a maximum period of time for
those under disabilities have been adopted in some twenty states:78
This suggests a fairly widespread recognition that the desirable effects
of quieting titles outweigh the occasional losses to persons who do'
not assert their rights within a reasonable time. More is involved than
a question of quieting titles. Of most importance is the social interest
in requiring the settlement of controversies while witnesses and evidence are available. An extension of this policy should be a part of
the legislative program of every state desiring to give to statutes of
limitations the effect that was originally intended for them.

3.

Statutes Barring Owners of Future Interests

As already mentioned, future interests are ordinarily immune to
the operation of statutes of limitations because the owners of these
interests cannot presently maintain possessory actions. Notwithstand78 Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 7, §36 (20 years); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1941)
§328 (the time, not exceeding 20 years, during which disability continues not deemed a part
of the 5-year statutory period); Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 40, §147 (statutory period of 18
years extended 2 years only); Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) §95.20 (30 years); Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948)
§413.030 (30 years); Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§565.101 to 565.109 (40 years); Minn.
Stat. Ann. (1945) § 541.15 (15-yearperiod extended for a maximum of 5 years except in case
of infancy, in which case a total of 22 years is possible); Minn. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947)
§541.023 ( 40 years unless notice filed); Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §711 (31 years); Mo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (1942) §1004 (24 years); Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann (1942) §1008 (31 years under
certain conditions); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (194~) §25-213 (21 years); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann.
(Supp. 1947) §76-290 (23 years unless notice filed); N.D. Rev. Code Ann. (1943) §47-0603
(IO years adverse possession with payment of taxes); Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §1-215
(IO-year statutory period not extended more than 5 years by any disability); Pa. Stat. Ann.
(Purdon, 1930) tit. 12, §82 (30 years); S.C. Code (1942) §385 (40 years); S.D. Laws
(1947) c. 233 (as against one in possession and having an unbroken chain of title since January 1, 1920); Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §§8586, 8587 (30 years); Tex. Civ. Stat.
Ann. (Vernon, 1941) arts. 5518, 5519 (25 years); Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) §5808 (20
years); Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) §786 (7 years adverse possession under
color of title); W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943) §5396 (20 years); Wis. Stat. (1947)
§330.33 (IO-year and 20:rear statutory periods not extended more than 5 years by any disability except infancy, in which case a total of 22 years is possible); Wis. Stat. (1947) §330.15
(30 years unless notice filed).
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ing this general rule, statutes in a few states apparently have been
passed with the intention of barring owners of future interests by
emphasizing the adverse possession and its effect on the title.79 Adverse possession in good faith under color of title is contemplated in
these statutes. Their language is usually to the effect that the requisite
period of adverse possession in good faith, under color of title, and with
payment of taxes shall operate to vest title in the adverse possessor.
Under such legislation it has occasionally been held that adverse possession may ripen into title even as against owners of future interests,
but for the most part such statutes have sooner or later been construed
not to bar interests which were not presently possessory.80
Except in rare cases, as for waste, a remainderman has had no
right to bring an action against a present possessor. A number of statutes have been passed in recent years permitting an owner of a future
interest to maintain an action against a present possessor for the purpose of determining his title and compelling a recognition of his
right. Where such actions are permitted, it may be asked whether
this is sufficient to require him to bring such an action in order not
to suffer the ordinary consequences of adverse possession.
An Iowa statute81 thus authorizes an action to quiet title to land
by any person "whether in or out of possession, having or claiming an
interest therein, against any person claiming title thereto, though not
in possession." This has been construed to bar a person having a future
interest from recovering land which has been occupied adversely for
the statutory period, since the statute afforded a present remedy to
such person to contest the right of the adverse possessor.82 Likewise, a
25-year statute of limitations in T exas83 purporting to bar even persons
under disabilities, has been held to preclude recovery of land by a
remainderman on the ground that he had the right to contest such
adverse possession by an action in trespass to try title. Proof of failure
to contest has been held to give marketable title under the statute.84
79 3 SIMES, LAw 011 FUTURE hrr.EREsTs, §777 (1936).
80 Gibbs v. Gerdes, 291 ill. 490, 126 N.E. 155 (1920); Dunlavy

v. Lowrie, 372 ill. 622,
25 N.E. (2d) 67 (1939); Content v. Dalton, 121 N.J. Eq. 391, 190 A. 328, affd. 122 N.J.
Eq. 425, 194 A. 286 (1937); McDowell v. Beckham, 72 Wash. 224, 130 P. 350 (1913).
81 Iowa Code (1946) §649.1.
8 2 Ward v. Meredith, 186 Iowa 1108, 173 N.W. 246 (1919).
83 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1941) art. 5519.
84 Howth v. Farrar, 94 F. (2d) 654 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938), cert. den. 305 U.S. 599, 59
S.Ct. 75 (1938); Free v. Owen, 131 Tex. 281, 113 S.W. (2d) 1221 (1938).
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A Nebraska statute85 was similarly applied in several decisions86 until
a recent reversal of policy.87
Instead of requiring an owner of a future interest to maintain a
present action to prevent the ordinary consequences of adverse possession, as is done in Iowa and Texas, the recording of an appropriate
notice by him as a prerequisite to the preservation of his interest might
well serve as a substitute for commencing an act_ion. 88 Notice would
thus be given to the person in possession and to all others who might
have occasion to acquire some interest in the property. A procedure
of this kind would be simple, expeditious and in accordance with the
fundamental purpose of the recording system itself in affording notice.
A spe~i6.c application of this proposed procedure could be made
to one of the most frequently recurring problems encountered in the
appraisal of titles, namely, to preserve the outstanding interest of
spouses who have not joined in the execution of conveyances, or who
have not done so effectively on account of some irregularity in attempting to do so. The dower, curtesy or equivalent statutory right of the
spouse whose interest has not been affected by the conveyance is truly
a future interest against which the statute does not ordinarily run
prior to the death of the conveyancing spouse. To allow land which
has been conveyed without the joinder of both spouses to remain unmarketable for a generation or more is obviously not in the public
interest. In the great majority of cases the nonjoining spouse dies
without ever making actual claim to the land. Statutes in approximately ten states have authorized a spouse to prevent the extinguishment of his or her claim in these circumstances by recording a timely
notice of it in the recorder's office.89 In this way the rights of a nonjoining spouse may be preserved by a simple expedient and at the
same time land titles are not allowed to remain unmarketable over
prolonged periods of time.
85 Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) §25-21,112.
86 First National Bank of Perry v. Pilger, 78 Neb. 168, 110 N.W. 704 (1907); Criswell
v. Criswell, 101 Neb. 349, 163 N.W. 302 (1917).
87Maxwell v.Hamel, 138 Neb. 49, 292N.W. 38 (1940); 23 NEB. L. R:e.v. 114 (1944).
88 Such a procedure is expressly provided for under several recent statutes discussed in
part ill B 6, infra.
89 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §61-226; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) §§2-628 to 2-637;
Iowa Code (1946) §614.15; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§558.81, 558.82, 558.91, 558.92;
Minn Stat. Ann. (1945) §§519.09, 519.10; Minn. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) §541.023; Mo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) §1009; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) §76-290; S.D. Laws
1947, c. 233; Wis. Stat. (1947) §330.15. As to statutes having a similar function and which
purport to bar the interest of a spouse with respect to conveyances of community property,
see Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941) §§164, 172a; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932)
§§ 10577-10580.
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4.

Statutes Barring Ancient Transactional Interests

The effect of statutes of limitations upon certain nonpossessory
interests is in direct contrast to their effect upon possessory interests.
Most interests of this kind-mortgages, land contracts, options and the
like-are collateral to a contractual obligation to pay money. Until
the contractual obligation itself is barred, the interest in the property
likewise continues in full force and effect. Contractual obligations,
moreover, may continue by partial payments, acknowledgments or
other operative facts, beyond the period when they would appear to
be barred according to the public records.
In the early history of our country numerous mortgages were put
on land. In the normal course of events most mortgages were paid,
but there was a tendency to overlook the necessity of recording a formal
discharge. Of those which were not paid, some became barred by
the passage of time or were abandoned. Some, however, were regarded by the parties themselves as subsisting obligations because of
partial payments on them or extension agreements. After a few
decades many mortgages remained unsatisfied of record and became
a serious impediment to the transfer of land.90 One could not ascertain
from the record whether a mortgage remained a valid lien, was barred
by limitations, or had been paid but not discharged of record. The
situation finally, toward the end of the nineteenth century, brought
forth some legislative action. For the most part early legislation was
predicated on the theory that the passage of a given period of time
would result in the barring of the right to foreclose the mortgage,
doubtless because it was thought that this was a recognized method
for dealing with the extinguishment of stale claims. The trend of
later legislation has been toward extinguishing the mortgage lien absolutely upon the passage of time and doing so independently of any
other events which have ordinarily tolled or extended the statute of
limitations.
Under traditional principles a mortgage does not become barred
merely because the debt which it secures becomes barred. 91 Historical
distinctions between actions on simple contracts, actions on sealed
instruments and actions for the recovery of land offer the explanation
for this peculiar paradox. Thus we have the curious phenomenon
that the remedy of a mortgage may be barred on the mortgage debt,
. 90 For a resume of early conditions in this respect see opinion of Burch,
Gibson, 88 Kan. 305, 128 P. 371 (1912).
912 GLENN, MonTGAGBs, §141 (1943).

J., in Shepard v.
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but the remedy of foreclosure on the mortgage itself remains because
of a longer period of lirnitations.92 Even a deficiency judgment may be
obtained against the mortgage debtor if the mortgage contains a covenant to pay the mortgage debt. This recognition of two distinct
limitation periods persists in many states today.
A somewhat different treatment, unlike that applied to mortgages,
developed for the enforcement of modern deeds of trust. Because the
deed of trust involved a present conveyance to a trustee, the transaction was viewed as a trust of a kind that continued until the performance of the trust purpose, namely, the payment of the debt for which
the deed of trust was given. As the law early developed, no lapse of
time barred the trustee from exercising the power of sale conferred upon
him by the transfer in trust. "Its lien runs on forever." 93 But in
course of time, deeds of trust gradually assimilated more of the character of mortgages, and statutes began subjecting them to restrictions
similar to those applicable to mortgages as to the time during which
powers of sale may be exercised. More and more, statutes have declared that a deed of trust may not be foreclosed by exercising the
power of sale after the time when a mortgage (if a mortgage rather
than a deed of trust had been given to secure the same debt) could not
be foreclosed by action, or after the debt which it was given to secure
has become barred.94
The next step in the development of limitations on the period
allowed for the enforcement of mortgages was one which recognized
the functional association of mortgage with mortgage debt. The legislative trend has been away from the rule which allowed one period for
the enforcement of the mortgage debt and another period for the
enforcement of the mortgage. Many states have passed statutes which
bar the enforcement of a mortgage after the mortgage debt to which
it is incident has become barred. The mortgage lien is made to expire
with the right to enforce the mortgage debt, thus identifying the two
things which had their origin in the same transaction. The rule that
a mortgagee may foreclose his security after-sometimes many years
after-the mortgage debt has become barred is increasingly giving way
to one that unites mortgage with mortgage debt. Also included in
92 Ibid. See also Hilpert v. Comm. (C.C.A. 5th, 1945) 151 F. (2d) 929, for a discussion
of the difference between sealed instruments and unsealed instruments in the application
of statutes of limitations.
oa 2 GLENN, MonTGAGEs, §144 at p. 822 (1943).
94 This trend is by no means complete, but it is an indication that deeds of trust should
be accorded the same treatment as mortgages insofar as their vitality is affected by the lapse
of time.
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this development is the tendency toward shortening the long periods
formerly governing the foreclosure of mortgages.
As one might expect, statutes of limitations for the enforcement
of mortgages, like other statutes of limitations, are subject to interruption or extension by new promises, acknowledgments, partial payments, disabilities of the mortgagee, and the like. Statutes of limitations. do not extinguish a debt; they merely furnish a defense to its
enforcement. A new promise to pay or an acknowledgment of the
old debt may revive it. Even a conveyance of land by the mortgagor,
reciting that it is subject to a mortgage, may have the effect of starting
the statute anew. 95 And when the debt is revived, so also may be the
mortgage. What is important to note in this connection is that none
of the acts or events which operate to toll the statute, to revive or extend
the mortgage lien, necessarily must or even customarily do appear of
record.
Inquiries as to facts or events not susceptible of being recorded are
often essential to ascertain the extent to which mortgages encumber
the land. It is not uncommon to find that positive evidence on the
subject is unavailable or unreliable. As far as aiding the problem of
marketable title is concerned the net effect of these statutes of limitations is almost nil. Under these conditions no purchaser is safe in
taking land subject to an unreleased mortgage, no matter how old it is.
Furthermore, an ancient dogma of equitable origin has dwarfed the
full effect intended for these statutes. Thus, whenever a mortgagor
has sought to remove the cloud of an ancient mortgage from his title,
he often has been met with the adage that "he who seeks equity must
do equity." Although he could successfully plead the statute of limitations to an action of foreclosure, he has not been permitted to remove
an apparent cloud from his title unless he has first paid the mortgage
debt. 96
The prompt assertion of claims is a social end sought to be achieved
by statutes of limitations. Another end is to give quiet and repose to
· titles. The maintenance of property in a merchantable condition is an
end sought to be furthered also by the recording system and by such
rules of law as the rule against perpetuities and the like. Yet in the
case of old mortgages-as is true generally-these statutes recognize
such a mass of exceptions that they render little real aid to a purchaser
95 2 GLENN, MonTGAGBs,
96 This has been corrected

§148.l, (1943).
by statute in some states. For a discussion of the whole problem and the change wrought by statute, see opinion of Burch, J., in Shepard v. Gibson, 88
Kan. 305, 128 P. 371 (1912). See also Cunningham v. Davidoff, 46 A. (2d) 633 (Md. 1946).
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in determining whether the liens of old mortgages continue to persist.
Furthermore, the number of equitable doctrines that have been applied
to prevent the running of these statutes as to subsequent grantees and
encumbrancers of the mortgagor is nothing short of astounding. The
only certain method of determining their status in most states became
that of obtaining a judgment in some legal action or proceeding in
which the defense of limitations was pleaded. An examination of
numerous cases discloses that ancient mortgages may sometimes be
foreclosed many years after their maturity under such statutes. As a
result, the favorable appraisal of a title by a third party became well
nigh . impossible and the problem of marketability remained largely
unsolved.
In 1922 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, influenced
by the difficulties encountered and the quantity of litigation under
statutes of limitations, proposed as part of a Uniform Mortgage Act
a solution based upon the state of the record.97 In the act as originally
drafted in 1922 a statutory period of fifteen years was proposed for the
barring of the foreclosure of mortgages, unless they were discharged
or extended of record within a period of fifteen years from the date of
maturity of the debt. No extension of the period was contemplated
as possible by reason of an unrecorded agreement, partial payment,
non-residence or disability. The lien of the mortgage was to be terminated for all purposes. This proposal was not entirely a novel one. A
similar statute was in effect in Minnesota98 and had been found to be
very satisfactory. However, a subsequent conference of the commissioners effected a change in the original act to provide that the mortgage should merely be "presumed to have been paid" after the expiration of the statutory period.99 Then the mortgagee's lien was to cease
only "as to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers for value who do
not have actual knowledg~ that the mortgage has not been paid." Thus
emasculated, the act as originally proposed lost much of its effectiveness
from the standpoint of subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers.
Furthermore, the impediment to marketability of the property itself
was not removed.
Although the earlier draft of the Uniform Mortgage Act was not
adopted by the commissioners, it nevertheless offered a definite appeal
97 See Handbook of Natl. Conf. of Comrs. on Uniform St. Laws and Proc. 1927, §12,
p. 680. At that time it was said that only five states had an effective statute of limitations as
to mortgages.
98 Minn. Laws 1909, c. 181, §§1, 2.
99 Uniform Real Estate Mtge. Act, §12. Up to the present time, no state has adopted
this Act.
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to the legislatures of several states, which have since adopted statutes
based upon that draft.100 Such statutes provide in effect that a mortgage shall cease to be a lien and that foreclosure shall not be permitted
after the expiration of a stated number of years from the maturity of
the mortgage debt as shown by the record or from the date to which
payment has been extended by agreement or memorandum of record
before that period. Under this type of statute nothing in the way of
disability or any other fact not of record is permitted to toll or extend
the operation of the statute. It is like a judgment lien which endures
for a definite period of time and no longer. Its effective duration can
be ascertained by mere reference to a calendar. The lien of the mortgage may be continued by, and only by, an extension agreement or
some equivalent memorandum of record. By this means a favorable
appraisal of title in this respect has finally become a reality in some
states. Ancient, unreleased mortgages can no longer cast a cloud over
the land. The slight burden thus imposed upon mortgagees to record
notice of all extensions of their mortgages is more than compensated
for in the increased marketability thus afforded land titles.
Other states have followed the suggestion of the later draft of the
Uniform Mortgage Act and have adopted statutes which, although
they apply ordinary principles of statutes of ·limitations as to the original mortgagor, nevertheless provide for a termination of the mortgage
lien after the expiration of the statutory period of time as to subsequent
purchasers or encumbrancers for value.101 The basic purpose of this
type of statute is to permit such purchasers and encumbrancers, in
appraising the title, to ignore mortgages whose maturity, as it appears
of record, exceeds the statutory period. According to many of these
statutes, provision is made for extending the mortgage lien by recording
an extension agreement or an affidavit or notice as to the amount re100 Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 40, §133; Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) §95.28; Ga. Code
Ann. (Park, Supp. 1947) §67-1308; ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1947) c. 83, §llb;
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1946) §§2-623, 2-624; Iowa Code (1946) §614.21; Kan. Gen. Stat.
Ann. (1935) §60-1802; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) §67-332; Mich. Comp. Laws
(1948) §§565.101 to 565.109; Minn. Stat. Ann (1945) §§541.03, 580.01, 581.13; Minn.
Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) §541.023; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) §§1017, 1018; Neb. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (1943) §25-202; S.C. Code Ann. (1942) §8864; Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams,
1934) §8590; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1948) §§5827, 5827c.
lOlAJa. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 47, §174; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §§51-1103, 51-1104;
Idaho Code Ann. (1948) §55-817; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §413.100; La. Civ. Code Ann.
(Dart, 1945) art. 3369; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §565.381; Miss. Code Ann. (1942)
§§719, 722, 875; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1935) §8267; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie,
1943) §45-37(5); Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) §8546-2; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1940) §68-113; S.D. Code Ann. (1939) §§33.0232, 33.0233, 33.0234; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann.

(Vernon, Supp. 1948) §5520.
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maining unpaid on the mortgage, ~r by re-recording the mortgage
itself. The sole purpose of this subsequent recording, of course, is to
give notice to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers for value who
could otherwise ignore the existence of outstanding mortgages which
have ceased to have life as against such purchasers or encumbrancers.
Although much to be preferred over former statutes of limitations
applying to mortgages, this form of statute still leaves much to be
desired from the point of view of marketability. Subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers will not universally risk dealings with the
owner of property having uncancelled mortgages. The practical danger
of litigation is not eliminated under statutes which permit the duration
of the mortgage lien to depend upon a fact not susceptible of being
placed of record, such as the state of mind of the purchaser or
encumbrancer as to knowledge of the unreleased mortgages or whether
such purchaser or encumbrancer was one "for value." The volume of
litigation on this point bears witness that mortgagees are not to be
deterred from attempting foreclosures, and sometimes succeeding, after
the statutory period as against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers
upon the averment that their dealings were not wholly for value or
were not in good faith.
Statutes of limitations have also been made effective to bar certain
other kinds of outstanding claims. For example, as was noted in the
case of old mortgages, the records are full of unreleased land contracts.
Notwithstanding actual forfeitures on account of defaults, these contracts continue to cast clouds on titles. Legislation designed to clear the
records of old land contracts has been far less frequent than that adopted
to remove the effect of old mortgages. Only recently have legislatures
given any appreciable attention whatever to the problem.102 Most of
this legislation has purport<=:d not only to bar the remedy of the vendee
after the expiration of a stated period of time but also to promote marketability by removing from the record the cloud cast by the contract
itself. A few similar statutes have been made to apply to option contracts,103 equitable charges,1° 4 notice of lis pendens105 and claims or interests asserted by recorded notice only or recited in deeds or other
documents.
102FJa. Stat. Ann. (1941) §695.20; Iowa Code (1946) §§558.5, 614.21; Mass. Ann.
Laws (Michie, Supp. 1948) c. 184, §17A; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) §76-265; Ore. Comp.
. Laws Ann. (1940) §§70-160, 70-161; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 12, §83.
10s Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 40, §116; S.D. Laws 1945, c. 215, §l(e).
104 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 12, §§80, 81; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942)
§5827a.
105Minn. Stat. Ann. (1945) §557.02; S.D. Laws 1943, c. 175, §1.
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Clearly the trend of legislative thought has been in the direction of
barring or extinguishing these old transactional interests in land by the
lapse of time. But the frequent association of contractual obligations
with the accompanying property interests has impeded the effective development of this thought into action. So long as the law or acts of the
parties have kept the contractual obligation alive, legislatures have hesitated to extinguish the property interests if the record itself does not
positively disclose the bar or extinction of the personal obligation. Several legislatures, subordinating their reluctance to their desire to emphasize and promote marketability, have placed a limit upon the duration of such property interests and at the same time have afforded ample
opportunity for extending their duration by recording a new and timely
notice thereof. This is clearly an essential part of improved conveyancing legislation.

5.

Statutes Barring Statutory Liens

In direct contrast to those statutes of limitations containing exceptions in favor of persons under disabilities and of owners of future interests, is another group of statutes which limit the duration of certain
interests to a stated time. This is notably true as to judgment liens.
Statutes in every state prescribe the period of time during which a judgment which has become a lien shall remain a lien. The periods vary
from two to fifteen years, with a large number providing for ten years.
The period of life is created to last for that time and no longer. Being
a creature of law, not of contract, such liens are not subject to being
tolled or extended by acts of the parties or by disabilities of the judgment
creditor. And the appraisal of titles which are affected by an unsatisfied
judgment is not subject to all the uncertainties that in a past era have
beset a title encumbered by an unsatisfied mortgage. Similar treatment
is accorded to execution and attachment liens, mechanics' liens, and
other liens which are imposed by statute.
No one thinks of challenging the wisdom of a stated absolute
period for the duration of such interests, whereas we continue to perpetuate the uncertainties involved in prescribing the duration of other
interests which have their genesis in contract. If we encounter an old,
unreleased mortgage, we are compelled to assume in many states that
it has been tolled in one way or another. But, if we encounter an unsatisfied judgment or mechanic's lien, we know that we may disregard
it ·with impunity and that it will cast no cloud upon the title.106 If any1oa For a pointed discussion of this difference in the treatment of these two different
kinds of liens, see opinion in Weekes v. Rumbaugh, 144 Neb. 103, 108-109, 12 N.W. (2d)
636 (1944).
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thing of social utility is to be gained by keeping our land records up to
date and by requiring periodic registration of old interests which are
entitled to continued life, then we should establish some reasonable
period during which all nonpossessory interests may persist but at the
end of which they will become liable to absolute extinction unless they
are properly preserved by re-recording. Our recording system can continue to function satisfactorily and efficiently only if barren claims
are cast out at stated intervals.

6.

Statutes Barring All Interests of Ancient Origin

The continuous lengthening of chains of title and the problem of
mounting title defects have led a number of states to attempt a new
kind of remedy that would apply to all kinds of claims and interests of
ancient origin. While interests arising by agreement of individuals may
differ in some important respects from those created by law, there is no
compelling need to recognize their duration for different periods of
time-one an uncertain length of time whose determination requires an
investigation of facts which do not appear on the public records and
the other an absolute period. Considerations of policy in the operation
of a system of conveyancing suggest that all nonpossessory interests be
treated in like fashion by recognizing their continued existence for
some specified period of time after their recording, but no longer. Old
interests of all kinds-possessory and nonpossessory, present and future,
vested and contingent-could be ignored if a conclusive presumption
were applied that they had become extinguished unless preserved or
revived in some appropriate manner on the public records that would
call them to the attention of prospective purchasers and mortgagees.
In very recent years several legislatures, striving to achieve these
precise benefits, have thoughtfully worked out one or more statutes to
promote marketability by barring or extinguishing all interests and
claims of every character which do not appear of record within a recent period of time. The first legislation of this kind was adopted in
Iowa in 1919.107 It purported to bar all actions based upon a claim
arising or existing prior to January l, 1900 unless notice of such claim
was filed before July 4, 1919. This statute was amended from time
to time, the last time being in 1943, so as to include all claims arising
or existing prior to January 1, 1930, the claimant being given until
July 4, 1943 to file notice of his claim in order to prevent its termina101 Iowa

Acts (1919) c. 270, §1.
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tion.108 This statute was obviously passed to clear titles of ancient defects and to bar all outstanding claims antedating a specified time, even
as against owners of future interests and persons under disabilities.
This was indeed a forward step in attempting to promote marketability
of titles by eliminating the major group of persons traditionally excepted from the operation of statutes of limitations. Moreover the extinguishment now purports to apply to all interests arising or existing
prior to January 1, 1930.109
This act applies in favor of the holder of the record title in possession, and provision is made authorizing the recording of an
affidavit showing such possession. The net effect is to permit a purchaser of land to deal with the owner of the record title whose chain
of title is complete since January 1, 1930, and who has possession, supplemented if necessary by an affidavit of possession, and to ignore all
interests antedating 1930 which have not been kept alive by recorded
notice thereof, except the possible claim of a spouse to dower or a distributive share and the rights of anyone to foreclose mortgages, bonds
for deed, trust deeds, or contracts for the sale of real estate, all of
which are covered by other statutes of limitations. Because of these exceptions a somewhat longer period of examination may be required to
determine whether any such interests of the kind mentioned remain
outstanding. Nevertheless the great bulk of old title defects are removed by this legislation, which is highly effective as a relatively short
statute of limitations.
In 1941 Illinois adopted a statute which also had the purpose of
eliminating old title defects, in this case those more than 75 years
108 Iowa

Acts (1943) c. 269, now Iowa Code (1946) §614.17.
interpretation of this statute in its application to unlmown or contingent remaindermen is distinctly worthy of note. In Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W.
553 (1941), a testator devised his farm to his son, Patrick, for life, with remainder to
• Patrick's heirs. Patrick gave a mortgage on the farm to defendant who later foreclosed it and
then claimed full title. Patrick had two sons born in 1917 and 1919. It was held that the
rights of these two minor contingent remaindermen "arose or existed" either when their
grandfather died in 1895 or upon their respective births, and that since their rights "arose or
existed" before 1920, they were barred under this statute even though they had not attained
their majority on July 4, 1932. The application of this legislation in the barring of persons
owning future interests and laboring under disabilities is highly significant in relation to its
avowed purpose of removing old claims with respect to owners in possession of land. This
case did not decide, however, whether the rights of the two sons of Patrick "arose or existed"
upon their grandfather's death in 1895 or upon their respective births in 1917 and 1919.
Certainly their claims depended upon the provisions of their grandfather's will which became
effective long before their births. But did they depend solely upon his will? And was it
the intention of the Iowa legislature to bar an owner of a future interest who was not even
living to record notice of it prior to its extinguishment by the statute?
109 The
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old.110 While this statute will doubtless be helpful in some ways to remove a number of old defects, it does not operate against the state or
against· real estate held for a public purpose by any municipality or
other political subdivision of the state. Nor does it apply to any person
who during the previous 75-year period or prior thereto shall not have
had the legal or equitable right to sue for and protect his claim, interest
or title. Thus owners of future interests are not barred, noc are persons
who have been under some disability but have had no guardian appointed for them. The same may be said of owners of interests which
are outstanding, such as long term mortgages which have not matured,
and with respect to which there has been no occasion or cause to commence an action. Unless the existence of certain facts can be determined from the record, the full potential usefulness of this statute will
not be realized, although many ancient title defects, such as informalities in the execution or acknowledgments of conveyances, may now be
disregarded in the· appraisal of land titles in Illinois.
Indiana also adopted a statute in 1941 similar to that of Illinois
but applicable to all defects more than 3 5 years old.111 This statute,
found to be far from effective, was repealed and replaced by another statute in 1947.112 Persons under disabilities and governmental units are
included within its provisions. The act precludes the commencement
of actions affecting the possession or title of real property founded upon an instrument, transaction, act, event or omission occurring more
than 50 years previously. Provision is made for filing a notice of claim
to prevent the extinction of an interest within the 50-year period. Persons under disabilities, owners of future interests and persons whose
claims or interests have not then matured could thus extend their
claims or interests. But a notice of claim filed within•the 50-year period
operates to extend the time for commencing an action only for one year
from the time of filing such notice. If an action is not commenced
within that time it is completely barred and all rights under the notice
are terminated according to the act. It is difficult to see how one may
commence an action that h~s not yet matured. To extinguish it before
it becomes actionable is arbitrary in the extreme. The validity of the
ac;t is certainly open to serious question on this ground.
Exceptions are made as to lessors on the expiration of leases and
mortgagees under mortgages extending more than 50 years. Further110 ID. Laws (1941) p.
111 Ind. Acts (1941)

854, §1, now ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1947) c. 83, §lOa.
c. 141, later appearing as Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, Supp. 1941)

§2-626.
112 Ind. Acts (1947) c. 193, now appearing as Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, Supp. 1947)
§§2-628 to 2-637.
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more, interests which are contained in the provisions and limitations of
the muniments of title of the record title owner are not affected by the
statute. Presumably these owners of future interests would not be
barred by the statute. To this extent also this act will fail in its declared
purpose "of simplifying and facilitating land transactions by allowing
persons dealing with the record title owner to rely on the record title
covering a period of not more than fifty [SO] years prior to the date
of such dealing."113
A committee of the State Bar Association of Wisconsin sponsored
and obtained passage in that state in 1941 of legislation which was
declared at the time to be "the most far-reaching expedient yet adopted
to restore the effectiveness of the recording system in facilitating transactions in land."114 Its dominant purpose was to simplify title procedure by eliminating ancient defects which do not represent honest or
real outstanding interests but which have nevertheless traditionalry rendered titles unmarketable. Not less important was its effect in reducing
litigation, especia.Uy with respect to actions to quiet titles instituted
only' to remove possible claims which had a formal but not a real or
substantial basis, and in promoting economy in land transactions generally.
1
Minor amendments were made in the statute in 1943 and again
in 1945.115 The purport of this statute is to bar any action affecting the
possession of or the title to real estate after 30 years by one not in possession, as against a purchaser for value, when the action is founded
upon any instrument executed or recorded more than 30 years prior
to the commencement of the action, or upon any transaction more than
30 years old, except that easements and restrictive covenants may be
enforced at any time within 60 years after their recording. Thus the
traditional exceptions ordinarily contained in statutes of limitations in
favor of owners of future interests and persons under disabilities are
abolished here in favor of the larger objective of promoting marketability of titles. To put it another way, as against a purchaser for value,
the statute bars all claims to real property, whether dower, curtesy, remainders, reversions, mortgages, old tax deeds, rights as heirs under
wills, or otherwise, and whether asserted by persons sui juris or under
disability, whether such persons are within or without the state, and
whether such persons are natural or corporate, or private or govem11s Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, Supp. 1947) §2-636.
114 55 HARv. L. RBv. 886 (1942).
115Wis. Laws (1943) c. 109; Wis. Laws (1945) cc. 29, 261; now Wis. Stat. (1947)
§330.15.
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mental, unless appropriate notice has been given or appears of records
within 30 or- 60 years, as the case may be. Thus all claims of all persons are barred unless properly preserved. Fully recognizing, however,
that certain interests are entitled to be preserved beyond the 30 and
60-year periods, the statute provides for their preservation for additional
periods of 30 to 60 years by the simple device of filing a claim similar
to a lis pendens.
As provided in the act itself, the legislative purposes are: (1) to
allow bona fide purchasers of real estate to rely on the record title covering the last 30 years, and (2) as against purchasers for value, to bar
all claims of more than 30 years which are not kept alive by recorded
notice within 30 years. The purpose first stated is to preserve and confirm the prevailing law under the existing recording system as to the
protection of bona fide purchasers who rely on the record of the preceding 30 years only. For that period of time the good faith of purchasers for value and constructive notice of the record play the same
part which they have always played. The second purpose is to bar all
claims jn excess of 30 years. As to the latter, no requirement is made
that a purchaser must be a bona fide one. Claims or interests more than
30 years old are barred irrespective of any knowledge or notice that a
purchaser may have. He is entitled to rely solely on the record title as
it appears during the preceding 30-year period.
Superficially it may appear that this is merely a statute of limitations with a 30-year period. The statute does bear a resemblance to a
statute of limitations, but to characterize it in this manner does not
properly state its true function or legal effect. If it can be called a
statute of limitations at all, it is not merely that. In the first place, it
does not require the commencement of an action to preserve a right.
The record of a notice is sufficient to prevent the extinguishment of a
right. This is particularly noteworthy in the case of owners of future
interests who have no present cause of action but whose rights would
otherwise be extinguished by the act. In the second place, the statute
does not apply to owners in possession, but only to purchasers. This
is totally unlike orthodox statutes of limitations which bar persons who
do nqt assert their rights against those in possession. In a word, the
limitation aspect of this statute applies only to purchasers after 30 years,
not to owners. Of course, other statutes of limitations may bar claims
against the owner, but the primary function of this statute is to promote
marketability by assuring purchasers that they are not under the perpetual duty of examining the record to determine whether claims having an origin more than three decades previously may still be extant.
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Common justice and expectation require that claims older than that
shall be deemed to be beyond revival, irrespective of their character or
ownership.
The problem of the examination and appraisal of titles is reduced
to a minimum. Except for a patent from the United States or other
source of original title, a purchaser need only inspect the title for the
preceding 30-year period to determine the vendor's interest and for 60
years to ascertain the existence of easements and restrictive covenants
which are not apparent from an examination of the premises themselves. This corresponds to the practice which actually prevails by custom in several states and communities of confining title searches to comparable periods of time. Numerous formal defects impeding the free
transfer of many titles are thus automatically removed in favor of purchasers by the passage of time. However, owners of genuine outstanding, subsisting interests will not be deprived of them unjustly, since
ample means are afforded to continue them in force. As a matter of
fact, it will be a rare case in which some other statute of limitations
does not bar a claim before this statute operates to do so. Considering
this legislation in its entirety and the system of land title transfers
which it inaugurates, it should operate in a dramatic way to purge our
land title system of its medieval barnacles and establish it as a twentieth
century method adapted to twentieth century institutions.
In 1943, Minnesota similarly enacted an important bit of legislation116 for the "purpose of allowing bona fide purchasers of real estate,
or of any interest therein, dealing with the person, if any, in possession,
to rely on the record title covering a period of not more than 50 years
prior to the date of purchase and to bar all claims" of every kind and
by whomever asserted unless some record evidence of the continued
existence of such claim is recorded within such 50-year period. The
original act of 1943 applied only to land which had been platted for
more than thirty years. By an amendment of 1945,117 it was made to
apply to all land. This act not only permitted but required a person not in possession of land who claimed an interest therein derived
from a source or title more than 50 years old to keep that interest alive
by £ling a notice thereof in the office of the register of deeds prior to
the expiration of the SO-year period. But it went even further and required him also to bring an action thereon within one year thereafter
116 Minn. Laws (1943) c. 529 §4.
117Minn. Laws (1945) c. 124, now Minn. Stat. Ann. (1945) §541.023. This statute
is discussed in Brehmer, "Limitations of Actions Affecting Title to Real Estate," 30 MINN.
L. Rnv. 23 (1945).
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to prevent its extinguishment. This was a desirable requirement as to
claims or interests which could then be made the basis of an action.
But with respect to reversions, remainders and other future interests
that had not become possessory, or to long term mortgages which had
not matured, it was not clear what action the owner of such a claim
could bring. For that reason the constitutionality of that part of the
act was questioned.118 It was also suggested that the statute might have
been construed so that its requirement of bringing an action within the
one-year period was not applicable to interests as to which there was no
right of action during that period.119
This act was amended in several important .respects in 1947.120
The first notable change made in the act by the 1947 amendment,.
which became effective on January 1, 1948, was to reduce the period
from 50 years to 40 years. This was a desirable change and did not
foreclose action upon old claims unreasonably. Although the act does
not enumerate the various kinds of interests in real estate affected, it
nevertheless bars all actions affecting the possession or title of real estate to enforce "any right, claim, interest, incumbrance or lien" with
respect thereto. Undoubtedly it was intended and will be construed
to include future interests as well as present interests, and nonpossessory interests as well as possessory ones. The act subjects all persons,
partnerships, corporations, states an'<i political subdivisions to its provisions. Furthermore, it contains no exceptions in favor of persons under
disability or of persons within or without the state. In other words, all
claims of all persons are barred unless timely sued upon or properly preserved by the £ling of a proper notice.
The second notable change is that the commencement of an action
within one year after the £ling of a notice qf a claim or interest in
land is no longer required. This should eliminate any question of the
constitutionality of the act as to claims or interests with respect to which
an action cannot be presently commenced.
Thus far considered the statute is purely one of limitations. Considering the 40-year period for the barring of all ancient claims based
upon previous instruments, events or transactions, the act contains the
basic ingredients of an effective statute of limitation,s. Litigation based
upon old claims should be materially reduced. But ancient claims
118 See Maloney, "Comments on Minnesota Laws, 1943, Chapter 529, Relating to
Limitations of Actions Affecting Title to Real Estate," 30 MINN. L. RBv. 32, 33 and 34 (1945).
119 See id. Such a construction was suggested as to another statute in Jentzen v. Pruter,
148 _Minn. 8, 180 N.W. 1004 (1921).
120 Minn. Laws (1947) c. 118, now Minn. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) §541.023.
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brought within the operation of the statute include not only those which
can be made the basis of a present action. They include as well all
rights and interests founded upon any instrument, event or transaction
which was executed or occurred more than 40 years prior to such time.
Thus all interests of ancient origin must be sued upon or preserved by
timely notice unless, indeed, the owner of such interest is in possession
of the land.
This brings us to the third noteworthy change effected by the
1947 amendment. Not only are ancient claims or interests barred after
the lapse of 40 years, but they also cease to affect marketability. The
statute now provides121 that the title of an adverse claimant which
would otherwise be affected by reason of such an ancient claim :'shall
not be deemed unmarketable by reason of the existence of such instrument, event or transaction." Thus old claims cease to clog the marketability of titles and the policy of the State of Minnesota that "ancient
records shall not fetter the marketability of real estate"122 is definitely furthered. Although this is not more than a mere expression of the legal
effect of the statute, it serves to emphasize an important principle which
is too often disregarded in practice.
Several exceptions to the application of the act are to be noted.123
The rights of the Federal government, of course, are not affected. In
addition, the record title or record interest, or title obtained by or
through any congressional or legislative grant, of any railroad corporation or other public service corporation or of any educational or religious
corporation is not affected by the act. Likewise the record of an undischarged mortgage or deed of trust executed by any such corporation need not be kept alive by filing the notice authorized by this statute in order to prevent the extinguishment of its lien. The most important exception of the statute is that it does not bar the rights of any
person, partnership or corporation in possession of real estate. Presumably the owner of land subject to a lease for more than 40 years would
not need to comply with the act and record notice of his reversionary
interest, since the possession of the lessee would be treated as the possession of the lessor. On the other hand, it would bar the rights of a
mortgagee who did not seek to foreclose until more than 40 years after
the executio.n of a mortgage even though it had not then matured;
similarly it would bar the rights of the owner of an easement after the
expiration of 40 years unless an appropriate notice were filed.
121Minn. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) §541.023, subd. 5.
1221d.
12s Ibid. at subd. 6.
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Fundamentally this statute is one of limitations. It is so denominated. Its provisions are orthodox in barring the commencement of actions after the expiration of a stated period of time. On the other hand,
its provisions are novel and effective in applying to all persons except
as against those in possession, irrespective of their disabilities, and to all
interests irrespective of the rights of their owners to commence actions
in order to insure the preservation of those interests. While marketability is not defined, this act will undoubtedly accomplish much in
promoting marketability of titles.
One feature of the I 94 7 amendment appears to detract from the
realization of the objective of this statute. The 1945 act:1 24 was intended to "effect the legislative purpose of allowing bona fide purchasers of real estate ... to rely on the record title covering a period of not
more than 50 years prior to the date of purchase . ... " By way of contrast it is provided in the I 947 amendment:1 25 that "no action . . .
shall be commenced ... to enforce any right, claims, interest, incumbrance or lien founded upon any instrument, event or transaction
which was executed or occurred more than 40 years prior to the commencement of such action, unless within 40 years after such execution
or occurrence there has been recorded . . . a notice" setting forth the
nature of such right, claim or interest. Unless barred by some other
existing statute, an action based upon some ancient claim or interest
may now be commenced more than 40 years afterwards provided only
that a notice of it was duly recorded within 40 years after the instrument, event or transaction by which it was created was executed or
occurred. Thus the owner of a reversion or remainder need only record
notice of his future interest the day after its creation and its preservation is thereby assured until his right becomes possessory. Sixty or
seventy years or even more may possibly expire before his right becomes possessory. Now he need not record within 40 years of the time
before his right to possession accrues. In the light of this provision a
purchaser can no longer rely on the record of a title within the past 40
years. He must ascertain whether any notices of any right, title, claim
or interest have been filed within 40 years after the execution of the
instrument or happening of the event by which_ the right was created.
This does not mean that any interest may be perpetuated indefinitely
for the act specifically provides that "it does not extend the right to
commence ·any action beyond the date at which such right would be
124 Minn. Stat. Ann. (1945) §541.023. (Italics added.)
121iNow Minn. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) §541.023, subd. I. (Italics added.)
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extinguished by any other statute." Nevertheless the £.ling of a single
notice may prevent the extinguishment of certain non-actionable claims
for a period far in excess of 40 years. In the process of amendment the
act has been deprived of that part which was designed to achieve its
primary objective of limiting title searches to the previous 40-year
period. Another feature of the mechanics of this statute is unfortunate.
In £.ling a notice of any claim or interest in order to preserve it, the act
requires1 26 its execution and verification by the claimant or his agent
or attorney. This may work an occasional unnecessary hardship upon
the owners of contingent future interests. Unborn or unascertained
persons who would ultimately become entitled to an interest in land
may not be able to protect their interests. While this will not often
happen, provision might well be made for such a notice to be filed by
any person on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person or class
of persons whose identity cannot be established at the time. In this way
reasonable opportunity would be afforded to preserve the rights of persons under disability or unborn and unascertained persons by relatives
or others who can do so for them.
With the impetus given by states elsewhere to the modernization of
their land title systems, the Committee on Real Property Law of the
Michigan Bar Association likewise undertook the task of removing
existing evils from its system of transferring real estate. Under the
leadership of the Committee and with the aid of Professor Ralph W.
Aigler, of the University of Michigan Law School,1 27 the whole problem was given extended study. The legislation recently adopted by
neighboring states was carefully considered. Finally an act similar to
that adopted in Wisconsin but differing from it in several significant respects was recommended to the legislature and adopted by it in 1945.
Instead of adopting a 30 and 60-year period for examining titles, a
40-year period was approved as the limit of search necessary for ascertaining the title of the vendor.
This statute is similar to the Wisconsin statute in extinguishing all
interests, claims, charges and defects more than 40 years old. But it
does not apply only to purchasers from owners; it applies as well to the
owner himself who has an unbroken chain of title of record for 40
years. In this respect it is more like a statute of limitations than is the
Wisconsin statute for it operates in favor of an owner as well as a purchaser from him. Nor is it necessary in Michigan to commence an

12ara.
121 See

(1945).

Aigler, "Clearance of Land Titles-A Statutory Step," 44 MICH. L. RBv. 45, 48
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action in order to preserve an interest more than 40 years old. The
mere recording of a notice is sufficient to prevent its extinguishment.
The act applies to and extinguishes all interests, claims and charges
of every kind, whether present or future, vested or contingent, and
whether owned "by a person sui juris or under disability, whether such
person is within or without the state, and whether such person is natural or corporate, or private or governmental." Exceptions are made
as to the United States, the State and its political subdivisions, reversions after leases, interests of lessees, interests of mortgagors and mortgagees under a mortgage executed by a railroad or other public utility
prior to its maturity, and easements or interests in the nature of easements the existence of which is clearly observable by physical evidences
of its uses. These last exceptions were added in 1946 and 1947 to exclude railroad and public utility mortgages from the operation of the act
and to eliminate the necessity on the part of railroads and public utilities of recording notices periodically of their rights of way which are
for the most part visible upon inspection.128 Also not within the terms
of the act is a person in hostile possession of land. Such a person cannot thus he deprived of his rights which he is fully enjoying.
One unusual feature of this statute concerns the filing of notices.
Especially in cases involving contingent. future interests, it is sometimes
impossible to know or ascertain who may become entitled to land at
some future time. It may he that unascertained or unborn persons may,
upon· rare occasions, he deprived of their interests without ever having
had an opportunity to assert them. This is an example of occasional
sacrifice which must he made in achieving the larger social ends made
possible by this legislation. Under similar provisions in other states,
owners of future contingent interests may sometimes be unable to preserve them by recording an appropriate notice. Express provision is
made here for anyone to record a notice of claim on behalf of himself,
of one under disability, or one unable to assert a claim on his own behalf, or of one of a class but whose identity cannot he established or is
uncertain at the time of filing such notice of claim for record. Many
parents and other relatives will doubtless make use of this provision to
preserve possible interests for their children or kin.
The language of the Michigan statute in describing the interests to
which it applies is different from that of any other similar statute. The
Iowa statute129 already described applied to and barred all interests and
128 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948)° §565.104. For a discussion of these amendments see
Aigler, "Amendments of the Forty-Year Marketable Title Statute," 26 Mi:CH. ST. B.J. no. 9,
23 (1947).
129 See note 109, supra.
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claims which "arose or existed" prior to 1930. It was pointed out that
it may be open to question whether certain interests having their origin
in an old deed, mortgage, will or other document arose or existed upon
the effective date of such instrument or upon some subsequent event,
such as the vesting of interests under that instrument, default in the
mortgage, or the like. No question of this kind is possible under the
Michigan act which applies to all interests, claims, charges or defects
that depend in whole or in part upon any act, transaction, event or
omission that occurred prior to such 40-year period. The perpetuation
of every kind of claim as a defect upon titles is definitely foreclosed unless kept alive as provided in the act.
The statute cannot accurately be described as a statute of limitations. It does have some characteristics of one in that it bars all interests and claims more than 40 years old that are not perpetuated by
recording a notice of claim. The commencement of an action, however,
is not essential to the preservation of a right. And unlike the Wisconsin statute it applies equally in favor of one having a 40-year record
title as well as to a purchaser. It also applies to persons who have no
present right to commence an action, including owners of future interests. The function and effect of the statute is to simplify and facilitate
"land title transactions by allowing persons dealing with the record title
owner ... to rely on the record title covering a period of not more than
40 years prior to the date of such dealing and to that end to extinguish
all claims that affect or may affect the interest thus dealt with, the
existence of which claims arises out of or depends upon any act, transaction, event or omission antedating such 40-year period, unless vvithin such 40-year period a notice of claim . . . shall have been duly filed
for record."130
•
•
This act will probably be more effective than any yet adopted to
put an end to the clogs of ancient defects upon land titles and to pave
the way further for the adoption of similar legislation elsewhere. The
Michigan Bar has given to it a whole-hearted approval and backing,
and the act shows what can be done to correct and modernize a system
that has increasingly been retarded by its own inertia and outmoded
operation.
Following the lead of Michigan in bringing simplicity to conveyancing procedure, Nebraska131 and South Dakota132 adopted· statutes
in 1947 substantially identical to the Michigan one. The Nebraska
180 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §565.106.
131 Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) §§76-288
182 S.D. Laws (1947) c. 233.

to 76-298.
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statute provides for a 22-year period for extinguishing interests having
their genesis prior to that time. South Dakota, on the other hand,
selects a point of time, January I, 1920, rather than a period of time,
as the basis for application of its statute.

IV
MA.rucETABLE TITLE AND CURATIVE STATUTES

A.

Nature and Purpose of Curative Legislation

Because of the frequency with which land has been transferred in
this country, and because some of the many persons who have engaged
in the conveyancer's art of drafting deeds and other legal instruments
affecting land titles have lacked sufficient skill, it is inevitable that
conveyances and instruments should repeatedly be found ineffective
for their intended purpose. Our land records are full of such instruments.
Title defects may be particularly expected in periods in which land
is being bought and sold in quick succession. There have been numerous "boom" areas in the history of this country; there have likewise
been ''boom" times when land has been transferred from one person to
another with a rapidity approaching commercial transactions of the
market place. With the increased use of printed forms and with legislative sanction of standard forms, one might expect to find the number
of errors reduced to a minimum. However, many unqualified persons,
deeming themselves fully competent, have undertaken to prepare legal
instruments of conveyance and to pass judgment upon their proper
execution. Mistakes have continued to be made. Even the imposition
upon public officials of the positive duty of passing judgment upon the
sufficiency and regularity of such instruments as a condition precedent
to recording them has not stemmed the tide of errors and imperfections. Nor have irregularities been confined to deeds and other primary instruments of conveyance. They have all too often been discovered in reviewing judicial proceedings which affect land titles and
are deemed to constitute a part of the chain of title.
Such is the background which has given rise to increasing legislation devised to cure and validate a great variety of defects existing in
land titles. A public consciousness of this problem existed even in
colonial times. An examination of legislation during this period reveals
numerous acts of legislatures designed to relieve landowners from hardships resulting from title errors and mistakes. As already suggested,
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current curative legislation is dire~ted largely to particular types of
errors which have been of frequent occurrence. When, for instance,
it is found that numerous omissions of a similar character have been
constantly made, there is reason to believe that a widespread misunderstanding has existed as to certain legal requirements. Curative acts are
frequently responsive to this condition. "The interests of justice and
general good of the community frequently require and sanction such
legislation," said Chief Justice Dillon of Iowa.133 It is for this reason
that curative laws have been said to be based upon a legal or moral
obligation.134 Such retrospective legislation, reaching back into the past
to operate upon past events, acts or transactions, supplies the lacking element to a legal act which the parties performed incompletely or imperfectly.
B.

Effect of Curative Legislation on Defective Titles

The cumulative imperfections in land titles resulting from errors
and mistakes and from incompetence on the part of those performing
the conveyancer's function have long been a matter of serious proportions. The enactment of curative legislation has been in direct response
to problems created. Most of these statutes have been passed to validate
or legalize defective conveyances or other legal instruments which
do not have their intended effect. In the typical case the parties
have entered into a contract of sale, the purchaser has paid the agreed
price, received a deed of conveyance and taken possession of the land.
If it should be discovered later that the conveyance was insufficient to
accomplish its intended purpose, the consequences are multiple. The
direct and immediate effects are, first, to prevent the intended conveyance from being effective as between the parties,135 second, to render
it insufficient to be recorded,1 36 third, to make it insufficient to constitute constructive notice even though it should be recorded,137 and,
fourth, to render it inadmissible in evidence in certain situations.138
The indirect and less immediate consequence, though not less serious,
133 Bennett v. Fisher, 26 Iowa 497 at 501 (1869).
134 Pilkington v. Potwin, 163 Iowa 86, 104, 144 N.W. 39 (1913).
135 PATTON, Lum TITLEs, §36 (1938); 4 TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed.,
§1027 (1939).
136 PATTON, Lum TITLES, §38 (1938); 4 TIFFANY, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed.,
§1027 (1939).
1S7PATTON, LAND TITLEs, §§37, 38 (1938); 4 TIFFANY, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, 3d
ed., §1027 (1939); 5 id. §1264.
138 PATTON, LAND TITLES, §§37, 38 (1938); 4 TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 3d
ed., §1043 (1939).
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is to impair the marketability of title ancl. thus subject its alienability to
a definite inertia.
The direct and immediate effects of a defective conveyance tend,
when brought to light, to produce litigation between the parties to it.
It may be an action by the grantor asserting that because the attempted
conveyance was "inoperative he should not be bound by it. Or it may
be an action by the grantee to reform the conveyance to conform to the
intention of the parties or to the terms of the contract. In any case the
question of the admission to record of the defective eonveyance may be
involved, and even if it is accepted for recording and actually recorded,
a real handicap may still face the grantee, for in many jurisdictions the
instrument may neither be admissible in evidence nor be deemed constructive notice to third parties.
·
The indirect consequence of defects and irregularities exhibits itself in the impairment of marketability of the title. In a great majority of instances the ineffectiveness of the instrument of conveyance
is not discovered until the purchaser desires to sell the land. And discovery at a late day may be too late. A previous grantor may not be
willing or available to give a corrective conveyance. A suit to quiet
title, corresponding tp a major operation, may be the only available
remedy to correct a relatively minor defect. The expenditure of time
and incurrence of expense are heaped upon a disappointed landowner
who may, furthermore, lose an advantageous bargain.
Time "cures" many defects, it is true, through the agency of statutes of limitations. But all too often insufficient time has elapsed or
some exception prevents the statute from operating to remove a particular defect. Such a "cure," however, is a cure only in the sense that
the owner of an outstanding interest is barred by the lapse of time from
asserting that interest. Unmarketable titles are not automatically converted into marketable ones by the passage of time. If titles are to be
cleared of outstanding interests more promptly and effectively than is
possible under most statutes of limitation, some catalytic agent is called
for. Curative statutes have been found to be successful for this purpose in a variety of circumstances. They are a specific remedy for unmarketable titles which have the essential substance but not the prescribed form of marketable titles.
A curative statute is one which corrects errors and irregularities in
past acts, transactions or legal proceedings and renders them valid and
effective for the purpose intended. It operates by completing a transaction which the parties intended to accomplish but which they carried
out imperfectly. An insufficient attempt to perform a legal act is thus
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converted into a complete legal act. An act inadequately performed becomes the equivalent of an act completely and perfectly performed.
In the case of a defective conveyance, the curative statute may
validate the transaction in the fullest sense. When A has attempted
to convey property to B but has failed to do so because of some oversight, mistake or formality of conveyancing, a curative act may validate
the conveyance just as though it had been properly executed in the :6.rst
place and thereby effect the transfer from A to B as it was intended.
The deed may have been recorded despite the irregularities contained
in it. Under some authority1 30 the deed may, therefore, not have been
"duly" recorded and, in consequence, may not afford constructive notice to third parties nor be admissible in evidence in any subsequent
action. A properly drawn curative statute will give to the conveyance
the added characteristics of legality of recording, constructive notice
and admissibility in evidence, effective at least from and after the effective date of the statute. The utility of such a statute is obvious, for it
can convert an instrument of meager or doubtful effect into one having
the full stature and substance necessary to carry out the original wishes
and intentions of the parties.
The virtue of curative legislation lies in the immediate and automatic operation in carrying out the intention of the parties to a prior
transaction without the need of resorting to a judicial decree for that
purpose. The defective conveyance becomes a completed legal act with
sufficient legal effect to establish marketability where none previously
existed. The normal expectations of the parties are satisfied. The social
interest of society in the security of transactions and in maintaining
acceptable land records is definitely advanced.
The foregoing is a general survey of the operation of so-called
curative or healing statutes. Obviously they cannot, in the nature of
things, apply to every attempted, but ineffective, transaction. In order
for such legislation to comprehend irregular transactions there must
have been enough done in the original transaction to show what the
parties intended. It has been said that there must be enough to justify
a court of equity in reforming and completing the act attempted and
intended by them, that the act intended must have been carried out to
such a point th~t equity would be warranted in decreeing its completion and confirmation. With respect to a statute passed by the Ohio
legislature in 1835 to legalize deeds of married women in which the
certificate of acknowledgment did not certify that the contents of the
189PA'lTON,

LAND TrrLEs, §§37, 38 (1938).
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deed had been made known to them by reading or otherwise, the
Supreme Court of Ohio said that "the act operates only upon that class
of deeds where enough had been done to show that a court of chancery ought, in each case, to render a decree for the conveyance, assuming that the certificate was not such as the law required. And where
the title in equity was such that a court of chancery ought to interfere
and decree a good legal title, it was within the power of the legislature
to confirm the deed, without subjecting an indefinite number to the
useless expense of unnecessary litigation."140
While this statement is a useful and reasonable one for justifying
the use of curative legislation as a means for correcting errors in conveyancing it does not necessarily state a limitation upon the application
of such legislation. In fact, an even more liberal application is illustrated by two early Pennsylvania cases involving a single conveyance,
one decided before the adoption of a curative act and the other subsequent to it. A husband and wife had executed a deed purporting to
convey certain lands belonging to the wife to a third party, who immediately reconveyed to the husband. The first deed was not acknowledged according to prescribed forms and was held invalid in an action
by the wife's heirs against the husband. Then in 1826 the Pennsylvania legislature passed an act,141 the object of which was to cure all
defective acknowledgments and to give them the same efficacy as if
taken in the proper form originally. The husband having died in the
meantime, his heirs then brought an action of ejectment. The wife's
heirs defended on the ground that the curative act violated the contract clause of the Constitution. This second action finally reached
the Supreme Court of the United States.142 Despite his aversion to
retroactive statutes generally, Justice Story in a very able opinion characterized the effect of curative statutes as confirming contracts, not as
impairing them. Prior to the adoption of the curative statute, however,
equity would not have reformed or corrected the deed of the married
woman. The lack of a right in the grantee which equity would enforce
did not preclude the curative statute from operating upon it. Even the
decree in the first case did not insulate the rights of the parties from
the effect of a curative statute subsequently passed to render the conveyance a valid one.
If one desired to formulate a rule of some generality for the legiti140 Chestnut v. Shane's Lessee, 16 Ohio 599 at 610 (1847).
141 Pa. Laws (1826) c. 61, pp. 187-188.
142Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 88, (1834), affg. Mercer v. Watson, I Watts
330 (Pa. 1833).
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mate functioning of curative acts, it would be on the basis of carrying
out the bona £.de intentions of parties and giving effect to the substantial equities growing out of transactions. Reasonable human expectations based upon colorable attempts in doing all that is believed to be
necessary is sufficient to support a statute's giving to the attempted transaction the effect which the parties intended and honestly believed they
were carrying out.
The distinction between the curative acts and statutes of limitations
was pointed out by Chief Judge Cullen in the opinion of Meigs v.
Roberts.143 The former, he said, are passed "to validate irregularities
in legal proceedings or to give effect to contracts between parties which
might otherwise fail for failure to comply with technical legal requirements."144 Referring then to the functional disability of curative statutes to affect legal proceedings lacking in the jurisdictional requirement, he said that "there may be in legal proceedings defects which are
not mere informalities or irregularities, but so vital in their character as
to be beyond the help of retroactive legislation; such defects are called
jurisdictional. This principle does not apply to a Statute of Limitations, for such a statute will bar any right, however high the source
from which it may be deduced, provided that a reasonable time is
given a party to enforce his right."145 Thus a curative statute corrects
and completes a particular transaction which has failed by reason of
some defect or irregularity; a statute of limitations, on the other hand,
bars the assertion of all rights or interests regardless of their nature.
In a sense statutes of limitations are more comprehensive and more
inclusive in their effect than curative statutes. Their shortcomings,
however, are in requiring the passage of undue periods of time and
often in failing to produce a marketable title of record even after the
expiration of the prescribed periods of time. A curative statute, on the
other hand, may operate immediately or after the expiration of a relatively short period of time. It may, in addition, result in giving marketable title. Both may operate to transfer title, the latter by completing
a transaction attempted by the parties, the former by barring the assertion of an outstanding right or interest acquired or retained by one of
them by reason of some irregularity in the transaction. Statutes of limitations are in part passive and negative in achieving effect. Curative
statutes are active and positive.
143 162 N.Y. 371, 56 N.E. 838 (1900).
144 Id. at 378.
145 Ibid.
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C. Types of Curative Statutes
Statutes exist in every state to cure and correct errors and irregularities in conveyancing.146 They are employed to validate instruments
which have been defectively executed in any of several ways: the lack
of a seal, an insufficient or improper attestation, an acknowledgment
insufficient for having been taken by an unauthorized person such as by
an officer outside the jurisdiction of his authority or one interested in
the property conveyed or a deputy officer in the name of his principal,
an acknowledgment of a married woman not having been taken
separately, a defective certificate of acknowledgment, a defective conveyance made under a power of attorney, the failure of a spouse to
join in a conveyance, the failure to mention or include in the body
of a deed a spouse who does join in executing it, direct conveyances between spouses, conveyances to one's self and another as joint
tenants or as tenants by the entirety, and a host of others too numerous
to mention here. Defective plats, conveyances containing defective
descriptions, and conveyances by persons under disabilities have even
been corrected in this manner.
Conveyancing instruments of corporations have brought forth a
host of special kinds of irregularities. The element of vicarious authority in corporations and the requirements of special formalities supply
the explanation for this situation. Numerous curative statutes have
been passed to correct corporation instruments executed by the wrong
officers or agents and instruments in which execution m a representative capacity is not clear. Corporation instruments lacking a seal have
frequently been validated in this manner. A second type of defect in
corporation instruments concerns conveyances made to or by associated
groups of individuals at a time when their corporate existence is not
yet complete or their formation is. defective. In other instances conveyances may be made after the expiration of their charter or after
the cessation of their corporate existence by dissolution or forfeiture.
Or, they may be made pending a renewal of their charter or after the
expiration of time for closing their affairs. In each of these situations
the validity of the instrument may be subjected to scrutiny and
declared ineffective or doubtful. Many statutes have been adopted
from time to time· to correct defects of this kind in corporation instruments and to eliminate any doubt which may have been entertained
146 All curative statutes in current use affecting land titles throughout the United States
have been collected and classified by the author but are too numerous to describe or reproduce
here even by way of citation.
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with respect to them. A third kind of defect frequently encountered
in corporate conveyances concerns the power of the corporation to
acquire and convey real property. If its articles of incorporation expressly or by implication do not authorize it to acquire real property
at all, or if it acquires it in violation of some statutory or other prohibition, what shall be said of the effect of an instrument purporting to
transfer real property to it? Finally, what is the effect of a conveyance made by a corporation of real property wrongfully acquired or
wrongfully held in ownership? Conveyances to and from corporations
under these circumstances have had their effectiveness impaired by
serious doubt. In efforts to afford relief short of actions to quiet title
a host of curative statutes have been adopted to cure any possible
question as to the effectiveness of such transfers and to reduce their
deterrent effect upon land titles generally.
•
In addition, there have been some few attempts to correct and
validate instruments purporting to transfer real property to and from
partnerships, unincorporated associations, trusts, governmental units
and governmental agencies.
Errors and irregularities have also appeared with considerable
frequency in judicial proceedings and particularly in probate proceedings which constitute the foundation for conveyances of fiduciaries, executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, receivers, referees,
assignees, commissioners, masters and other officers. Even though
statutes of limitations may have barred attacks upon these conveyances, further assurance and immediate correction have been afforded
by numerous curative statutes.
Another source of title problems has arisen in connection with
defective mortgage foreclosures, both in formal actions and by powers
of sale, and also in defective assignments and releases of mortgages.
Many irregularities of these kinds have been corrected by curative
legislation.
These examples illustrate what may be accomplished by means
of curative statutes. In some states each regular session of the legislature has seen fit to pass some curative legislation to correct the errors
coming into prominence since the last previous session. Legislatures
of other states have acted at less frequent intervals. Still others have
seen little need to employ this method of correcting past mistakes.
In surveying and classifying the existing body of curative legislation two general types may be noted. First, there are those which
have altogether a retrospective application. They are enacted to apply
to past conveyances or transfers which have failed to have their
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intended effect or which at least have resulted in producing unmarketable titles. Their application is restricted to instruments made
prior to the passage of the statute. To be continually effective they
need to be re-enacted periodically in order to apply to conveyances
and transfers made during the interval since the effective date of the
statute. Second, there are those which have purely a retrospective
application but which are continuously operative and apply automatically to future transactions after the occurrence or, more frequently, after the expiration of some designated period of time thereafter. In a sense they have both a prospective and a retrospective
operation. To make them applicable to future transactions immediately upon their completion, however, would be the equivalent of
authorizing in advance an alternative method for performing a legal
act, namely, making an effective conveyance. This would seriously
tend to relax the protective requirements imposed by society upon
the performance of such acts. Moreover, it would detract from the
effort to provide high standards of craftsmanship in the preparation
of deeds and conveyances. It would constitute, in effect, advance
authority to commit errors, to relax vigilance in the everyday tasks
of conveyancing. Hence, a period of time must usually elapse after
a transaction before the statute becomes applicable to heal the imperfection.
The more desirable type of curative statute is exemplified by the
comprehensive curative act adopted in Nebraska in 1941, which
provides:
'When any instrument of writing, in any manner affecting or
purporting to affect the title to real estate, has been, or may hereafter be recorded for a period of ten years in the office of the register of deeds of the county wherein such real estate is situated, and
such instrument, or the record thereof, because of defect, irregularity or omission, fails to comply in any respect with any statutory
reguirement or requirements relating to the execution, attestation,
acknowledgment, certificate of acknowledgment, recording or certificate of recording, such instrument and the record thereof shall,
notwithstanding any or all of such defects, irregularities and omissions, be fully legal, valid, binding and effectual for all purposes
to the same extent as though such instrument had, in the first instance, been in all respects duly executed, attested, acknowledged
and recorded."147
147Neb. Laws (1941) c. 152, §1 at p. 593, now Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) §76-258.
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This statute does not cure any defect, either formal or substantial,
in an instrument immediately upon its execution or upon its recordation. Otherwise it would dispense with the desirable and important
formalities required in connection with making transfers of land.
Ten years must elapse after recording transfers before their defects
can be ignored. Then, and not until then, do the instruments become
competent evidence and constitute constructive notice to the same
extent as if valid in the first instance. The important fact to note
is that the statute does not require a periodic re-enactment; it applies
to all instruments, whether previously or hereafter executed.
As mentioned earlier in this study, there is considerable variation
in the curative legislation adopted throughout the country. Such laws
are scant in some states, numerous in others. The great need is for
comprehensive and systematic curative laws that will apply to the
bulk of transactions in which irregularities occur and that will apply
to future transactions as well as past ones. Such laws are eminently
just. They are also essential to promote marketability.

V
MArurnTABLE TITLE DECLARED AND DEFINED

A. Positive Approach toward Marketability
The definition of a marketable title ordinarily applied is one free
from all reasonable doubt.148 To state it another way, a marketable
title is one which does not contain any possible defects or outstanding
interests which may impair the interest of the owner. This negative
statement of marketability contains no positive standard by which
an examiner can make an appraisal of a title except to satisfy himself
of the complete absence of all outstanding interests and possible
claims. As chains of title become longer with each successive transfer
this has become increasingly more difficult to do. We need to replace
this negative approach by a positive one which will make the marketability of titles depend solely upon their state during some recent
interval of time rather than upon their entire history. Since so little
has been done in this direction, the references must be few. But the
promises which this approach offers to conveyancing are many.
148 PA'ITON,

Lum TITLES, §29 (1938).
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Statutes Limiting Effect of Defects on Marketability

Not until recently has any attempt whatever been made to revise
our notion of marketability so as to render outcast certain ancient
defects or certain kinds of other defects. One noteworthy effort was
made by the South Dakota legislature in 1945. Certain alleged defects had caused examiners to declare titles unmarketable. In that
year the legislature passed a statute doing away with certain acts
in order "to make real estate titles marketable."149 It was there provided that henceforth it should not be necessary to perform certain
acts to correct the record with respect to any titles to real estate in
order to make such title merchantable in any instance where the defect
or omission had existed of record for a period of 20 years. True, the
cure was not complete because it singled out a few particular kinds
of defects. But it was a start. It gave assurance to an examiner by
telling him explicitly that certain old defects should not hold back
marketability for more than 20 years. To that extent marketability
was defined by law in tJ::iis delineating fashion.
Again, in 1947, the Nebraska legislature adopted the entire set
of Real Estate Title Standards that had previously been adopted by
the Nebraska State Bar Association.150 The force of law was thereby
given to the patterns created and observed by the organized bar. Here
was a real and substantial step. A large segment of problems previously
treated as serious deterrents on marketability in Nebraska can now
be handled with assurance because marketability of land titles will
not be affected by the existence of any defect specified in the statutes.
Because of this broad coverage much improvement may be expected
in Nebraska in promoting marketability and simplifying conveyancmg.
In 1941 Illinois made a bold attempt to render all deeds, instruments and judicial proceedings relating to or affecting the title to real
estate and more than 75 years old ineffective to constitute notice,
either actual or constructive, inadmissible in evidence and insufficient
to render any title unmarketable or allowed to be alleged or proved
as the basis of any action.151 Certain exceptions, however, were made
as to persons who had no right to sue for and protect their interests.
Provision was included for a person to extend this period for an addi149 S.D.

Laws (1945) c. 215.
150Neb. Laws (1947) c. 249, §1, now Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) §§76-601

et seq.
151 ill.

§lOa.

Laws (1941) p. 854, §1, now ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1947) c. 83,
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tional period of ten years by filing for record a notice of his claim.
An indication of the confidence reposed in this statute by the bar is
disclosed in the adoption of a title standard suggesting that full
weight be given to this act unless a notice of outstanding interest
appears of record. The utility of this measure in terms of actual
observance by title examiners remains to be seen.
Indiana also adopted a statute in 1941 similar to that of Illinois
but applicable to all defects more than 35 years old.152 The exception
of "vested property rights" and persons under disabilities did not give
this legislation the functional value which might have been given to it.
It did not apply to future interests or to interests which were not actionable. This statute was obviously an attempt to eliminate apparent
claims arising from mistakes and irregularities as clogs upon marketability, but no guide was furnished as to how these claims could be
distinguished from "vested property rights." This statute was repealed
in 1947 and replaced by another which attempts to extinguish claims
more than 50 years old and to provide that a purchaser for value of
land from one against whose title no notice of claim has been filed
shall have a marketable title to such land.153 There is some indication
that all attorneys in Indiana have not been willing to accept 50-year
abstracts as sufficient evidence of marketable title.154

C.

Legislation Declaring and De-fining Marketability

The most important single piece of legislation which has given
positive form and meaning to marketability is that adopted by Michigan155 in 1945 and borrowed by Nebraska156 and South Dakota157 in 1947. These acts were part of comprehensive title legislation enacted in these states. They were drawn to accomplish two
basic functions: (I) to bar and extinguish all claims and interests
having an origin prior to a certain date or period of time; and (2) to
define the marketability of the owner's title in terms of his record
title during a specified recent period of time. In one respect they
constituted statutes of limitations; in another respect they created a
152 Ind. Acts (1941) c. 141, §l, later appearing as Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums,

Supp. 1947)

§2-626.

153 Ind. Acts (1947) c. 193, now Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, Supp. 1947) §2-632.
154 See reports as to attitude of Indiana attorneys contained in letters referred

to in
Record Land Titles 25, Publication No. 155, Research Department, Kansas Legislative Council (1948).
Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §565.101 et seq.
156 Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) §§76-288 to 76-298.
157 S.D. Laws (1947) c. 233.
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new conception of marketability. The limitation aspect of these
statutes has already been discussed.158 The avowed purpose of the
Michigan act, which was drafted by the Committee on Real Property
Law of the Michigan Bar Association with the aid of Professor Ralph
W. Aigler of the University of Michigan Law School, was to' simplify
and facilitate land title transactions by allowing perJ,ons dealing with
the record title owner to rely on the record title of the previous 40year period. The unique approach of the act was in defining marketable title. "Any person, having the legal capacity to own land in this
state who has an unbroken chain of title of record to any interest in
land for 40 years," the act states at the very beginning, "shall at the
end of such period be deemed to have a marketabl~ record title to such
interest, subject only to such claims thereto and defects of title as are
not extinguished or barred" by other provisions of the act. This concise
formulation of marketability establishes marketability as a working
function of events shown of record during the most recent 40-year
period. To bring about this definition of marketability, the act necessarily goes further by barring and completely extinguishing all interests, claims and charges whose existence depends on any act, transaction, event or omission that occurred prior to such 40-year period.
Persons under disability, persons owning future interests and governmental units are all similarly affected. Otherwise these interests
would continue to defeat the dominant objective of the act.
This novel piece of legislation makes one additional requirement,
and that is that no other person be in hostile possession of the land.
If, then, a person has an unbroken chain of title of record to land for
40 years and also has possession of it, or if no one else has hostile
possession of it, that person has a good marketable record title. The
objective of this statute is easy to understand and to apply. There are
no involved conditions or provisions to detract from its simplicity. The
tremendous impetus which this new method of evaluating marketability of titles promises to give to conveyancing procedure is obvious.
It cuts loose from all old norms of judging marketability and substitutes
a system that is efficient in practice and eminently fair in application.
That two other states-Nebraska and South Dakota-have seen fit so
soon to adopt this act almost literally and that others are seriously considering it suggests that it possesses values which will render its plan
a permanent one in American title procedure.
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This Michigan form of statute is the backbone of any comprehensive plan for reform in conveyancing procedure. In one step it accomplishes two of the most important objectives enumerated at the beginning of this study. It defines marketable title positively and at the
same time, as a means of doing this, it extinguishes all interests and
claims whose existence depends on any act, transaction, event or
omission prior to the period of time during which marketability is to
be appraised. Such legislation gets at the heart of the matter and
eliminates the practical need for certain other kinds of legislation
except as to events occurring within the period of the statute. With
legislation authorizing the liberal use of recorded instruments for
establishing and proving titles and comprehensive curative legislation
to apply to deeds and instruments executed within the past 40 years,
conveyancing procedure is at its best.

VI
CONCLUSION

Conveyancing procedure has become progressively and unnecessarily complicated in most states. The resulting inefficiencies in real
estate transfers is a matter of serious social consequence. Correction
of the condition is a social responsibility which cannot longer be
avoided.
Casting aside the entire existing system and starting over again
at this time is unthinkable. The universal adoption of the Torrens
system is believed by many not to be an advisable means of solution,
and such is probably not now feasible. Yet thoroughgoing improvements and revisions in our present system of transferring land are not
only possible but are already a substantial reality in a few states.
The goal is that of comprehensive simplification. The steps to
be taken are not radical and, broadly considered, they will promote
progress and further the social good. They consist in four methods
of approach: ( 1) in liberalizing rules of evidence to permit ready
proof of titles from the public records and, within such limits and
subject to such controls as will hold dangers at a minimum, in rendering explanatory affidavits and recitals in other instruments valid
as contributory devices of establishing marketability of land titles;
(2). in revising statutes of limitations so as to include all interests and
claims whose existence depends on any act, transaction, event or
omission that occurred more than some stated period of time prior
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to the present, irrespective of persons under disabilities, owners of
future interests and governmental units; (3) in adopting comprehensive and systematic curative legislation to correct all apparent claims of
an unsubstantial character, especially those of more recent origin, and
( 4) in adopting a positive concept of marketability such as that recently formulated in Michigan.
None of these lines of action is entirely untried. All have been
thoughtfully considered, but with varying degrees of adoption. Each
of the four methods has been adopted by more than one state. The
paths toward simplicity and efficiency, with their resulting benefit
upon land development, have now been blazed. It remains only to
utilize them. The benefits to be derived from a streamlined conveyancing procedure are available. Appropriate legislative attention can
extend these benefits to all communities on a broad scale.

